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viding a philosophical therapy within an account of his life, as I think it help-
ful in developing our understanding of his ‘philosophy as therapy’ to know a 
little of his life and times. However the danger in writing biographies (and no 
doubt summaries), one of his executors (Anscombe) once remarked, is that 
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Western culture had fallen from a cultural peak achieved at the time of Bach. 
“Music came to a full stop with Brahms; and even in Brahms I can begin to hear 
the noise of machinery” (Drury, 1984, p.112). “[I]t isn’t absurd … to believe 
that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for human-
ity” (1980, p.56); but “perhaps one day this civilization will produce a culture” 
(1980, p.64). In a letter to his friend Maurice Drury (a psychiatrist) in 1946 
he said he was writing for people a hundred years from then, when culture 
might be returning (Drury, 1984, p.160). 
When he was 24, he learned Danish so he could study Kierkegaard in the 
original language, especially the mystical idea of a ‘world soul’ (not something 
to be believed in so much as experienced) and, during the First World War, as 
a soldier in the Austrian army, he read Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, 
learning the speeches of the character Father Zossima by heart. Later he told 
his psychiatrist friend Drury that there really have been people like Zossima 
“who could see directly into the souls of other people and advise them” (Monk, 
1991, p.549). As he carried Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief with him during the war, 
he became known as ‘the man with the gospels’. However, he made clear to 
friends that he couldn’t believe what Catholics believe, and Bertrand Russell 
reports he was harsh on Christians in general. Again, his interest appears to 
have been mysticism, in the sense of being at one with the world.
At the age of 19 (in 1908), he came to Britain as an aeronautical engineer, 
and has a propeller patent from this period. Three years later, he arrived 
unannounced in Bertrand Russell’s room at Cambridge to discuss the foun-
dations of mathematics and logic. Russell invited him to his lectures and he 
was soon dominating these, and even pestering Russell after the lectures. 
Although Russell thought Wittgenstein was a genius, others thought he was a 
crank. By the time he was 27 (in 1916), he was severely criticizing Russell’s 
work. 
Philosophy as therapy
It could be said that the criticism of Russell and others was that Wittgenstein 
saw the purpose of philosophy quite differently. “Philosophy is not a body of 
doctrine but an activity” (1961, §4.112). Traditionally, since the time of the 
Greeks, philosophy in the West has been viewed as a “love of knowledge” or 
an attempt to grasp the essential nature of reality. Thus most of our philoso-
phers have taken a position on various ideas, allowing us to categorise them 
as realists or nominalists, positivists or phenomenologists, etc. Whereas they 
wanted to paint a grand picture of the world, Wittgenstein was more bent 
on attuning us to the world, by untangling (or dissolving) the philosophical 
the writer tends to drag his or her readers down to the biographer’s level 
(Englemann, 1967, p. xiv). Therefore, I offer my apologies in advance.
From Vienna to Cambridge
Ludwig Wittgenstein was born on April 26th 1889 as the youngest of eight 
children in the second wealthiest family in the Austrian-Hungarian empire 
(after the Rothschilds). There appears to be nothing in his school years to 
indicate the plaudit of ‘genius’ later bestowed upon him. Indeed, he was con-
sidered by some as the dullard in the family. The family homes were the cen-
tre of culture and humanity in Vienna, with the likes of Brahms and Mahler as 
regular visitors. Gustav Klimt painted a famous picture of his sister Margaret; 
and Ravel wrote a famous piece for a one-armed piano-player following his 
brother Paul’s loss of an arm during the First World War. Ludwig himself was 
particularly adept at whistling long detailed musical pieces. 
Although mostly home-schooled, he did attend a school briefly, which was 
also attended by Hitler. This led one writer (Cornish, 1998) to speculate that 
Hitler began his hatred of the Jews due to his schoolyard relationship with 
Wittgenstein (the Wittgenstein family had converted to Catholicism from 
Judaism two generations prior to Ludwig’s birth); but the evidence for this 
is considered poor. The only subject in which he did well at school was reli-
gious studies, which — as we shall see — was significant; and he told a friend 
later in life, “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view” (Rhees, 1984, p.79). After completing the work 
described in this paper, he worked as a gardener in a monastery for a while, 
and considered becoming a monk.
It is perhaps noteworthy that three of his four brothers committed suicide, 
and he wrote at various times in his life of his own contemplations of this. He 
was not totally at peace with his homosexuality either, and his brother Rudi 
referred to his own “perverted disposition” in his suicide note. A good argu-
ment has been made that Ludwig was an ‘exile’ in numerous ways (Peters, 
2008). He became an exile from Vienna and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, 
his family from Judaism, and he spent time in self-imposed isolation in Nor-
way and Ireland during his years as a philosopher at Cambridge. He often 
referred to himself as an outsider, e.g., “The philosopher is not a member of any 
community of ideas” (1967, §455). He was, in many ways, an anthropological 
participant observer of our industrial culture. Is this not the position Foucault 
(2001) indicates the therapist adopt in order to engage in ‘fearless speech’? 
Similarly, he had much sympathy for Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of 
the West; the idea that with the rise of the Newtonian mechanical mindset 
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something about our nature and life, rather than say how it is.
Saying and Showing
His anti-theoretical position finds expression in his elucidations on the dis-
tinction between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’. Many in the SFBT community are 
familiar with Ben Furman’s metaphor of therapists as “pickpockets in a 
nudist camp” (Furman & Ahola, 1992); our task is to show people their own 
solutions, and we can’t say what they are prior to picking their pockets. In 
everyday life, if someone makes an error adding up numbers, we endeavour 
to show them the error in their calculations. Just as with SFBT’s solutions, 
many of Wittgenstein’s elucidations consist of showing us aspects of our own 
actions we hadn’t noticed before. Now an elucidation is like getting a joke 
or understanding a mathematical proof — we need to see it or ‘get it’. The 
elucidation doesn’t say (or show anything extrinsic to the joke or proof); the 
person has to use the elucidation. An elucidation (noun) doesn’t automati-
cally elucidate (verb). Suddenly the duck becomes the rabbit, or the two faces 
become the vase, in those well-known ambiguous figures. 
The First World War and the Tractatus
The First World War interrupted the development of these ideas stemming 
from his arguments with Russell, so he returned to Vienna to enlist in the 
Austrian Army. During the war, he became a highly decorated officer, getting 
an Austrian medal equivalent to the Victoria Cross. He ended the war as a 
POW in Cassino, Italy, where he completed the manuscript for Tractatus Log-
ico-Philosophicus. He ends this very short book (about 70 pages) with the 
comment, “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands 
me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he 
has climbed up on it.)” (1961, §6.54). This work, he believed, has essentially 
shown (for those who get the elucidations) how these various foundational 
ideas arise from out of doing logic and mathematics. As this work answers all 
the questions of philosophy, he thought he could now retire from philosophy 
and do something else. 
knots in our thinking so that we could see (or be with) the world with clarity. 
It might be said, that for Wittgenstein, any theory or doctrine about the world 
was an indication of philosophical confusion; and as Bill O’Hanlon and others 
have said, “a hypothesis might accidentally enter a therapist’s head and the 
best remedy for it is to lie down until it goes away” (1987, p.98).3
With the benefit of his later work, and the efforts of nearly a century of 
work by philosophers, we can now shed new light on his first attempts at 
philosophical therapy. For example, he was later to say that “[t]he work of the 
philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (1958, 
§127). One “reminder” that Steve de Shazer (2005) used a lot was “don’t think, 
but look!” (1958, §66). Another is the insight Wittgenstein brought to Cam-
bridge with him, and was to feature prominently during the rest of his life; the 
idea that some words which have more than one meaning beguile us at times, 
as our attention can shift from one its meanings to another without us notic-
ing. He called this the cardinal problem in philosophy (Kremer, 2007). “Phi-
losophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our 
language” (1958, §109). To guard against being seduced by shifting meanings, 
his teacher Frege had warned him to pay particular attention to the context 
in which the word is being used. Remaining context focused (and not getting 
lost in your hypothesis) is a hallmark of Wittgenstein’s work as it is in SFBT 
(de Shazer, 1994).
Another helpful reminder of where Wittgenstein’s philosophical therapy 
is going, allowing us to make sense of some of the more difficult passages, is 
the claim by Moyal-Sharrock (2013) that the most important contribution he 
made was to revive the animal in us; that despite all our ‘civilizing’ we are still 
fundamentally animals. There is “something instinctive, thought-free, reflex-
like” (p.263) about us; that most of the time our actions are not mediated 
by intellectualisations. Somewhat similarly, John Shotter (2004) has empha-
sised on the basis of Wittgenstein and others’ work, that there is a spontane-
ous, embodied, anticipatory, mutual responsivity, occurring between us when 
we communicate, not only providing the context for our utterances, but also 
allowing us to complete each other’s sentences at times. Although I am pre-
senting Wittgenstein’s work here largely as a theory or doctrine about human 
nature, Wittgensteinian scholars stress that this can generate the very phil-
osophical traps that he is wanting to free us from.4 He is wanting to show us 
3. Wittgenstein said: “Don’t, for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay 
attention to your nonsense” (1980, p.56). Kierkegaard also comments on the difference in the 
ways people talk nonsense; that comes closer to the irreverence of Robert Anton Wilson’s 
idea that bullshit is everyday nonsense but every now and then someone tries to force horse-
shit on you. 
4. There is an immense trap that numerous constructivists and social constructionists have 
fallen into when they presented Wittgenstein’s ideas as a causal theory of social construc-
tions. Such errors lead to a re-animation of the Cartesian ego endeavoring to manipulate 
social constructions (e.g., by law) rather than deconstructing these realities to see if alterna-
tive constructions might arise (a change in lore). See Francis (2005) and Shotter (1995, 2005).
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position outside of the world (or apart from it). This was very difficult for 
his contemporaries to grasp as they were well entrenched in the ‘objectivism’ 
that positivism built its house on.
Now he goes on to point out that there may be regularities in nature but 
primarily they show themselves to us. In the duck-rabbit figure we see the 
duck, we see the rabbit, but we don’t see both at the same time. We obviously 
can’t step outside of the world and say (see or describe) both at the same 
time. We can of course do what I am doing here, describe what we are doing 
as we move from one viewpoint to the other, but we can’t, as his publishers 
expected him to do, say how the world is as a whole. “If there were a law of 
causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of nature. But 
of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest” (1961, §6.36). Twelve 
years later, when he was contemplating this puzzle again of what can be 
shown more than can be said he noted: “What a Copernicus or Darwin really 
achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but a fertile new point of view” 
(1980, p.18e). We could say the same of Einstein in comparison with Newton. 
They saw the ‘rabbit’ that hadn’t been noticed before. For Wittgenstein, sci-
ence is descriptive, not explanatory.5 As we have seen, his aim was therapeu-
tic, and thus he wanted to get rid of all explanations as they take us out of this 
world to an imaginary realm about the world (which leads us to think we can 
control it). Wittgenstein’s elucidations help us stay attuned or present to the 
world, and allow us to see or understand ordering processes in a new light. 
He wanted to dissolve all the world views of previous philosophers. Different 
perspectives, like Copernicus or Darwin achieved is fine, but there is no one 
world view here. No argument with the creationists. “Our craving for general-
ity” (1966, p.17) is a major source of confusion in philosophy. 
Thus the aim of the Tractatus was to draw a limit to what can be said. 
During the three or four years it took to get the book published, he sent a 
letter to a publisher saying the book is made up of two parts. The part in 
writing, and “everything I have not written. And precisely this second part is the 
important one” (Monk, 1991, p.178). Hardly the sort of comment that might 
endear the work to a publisher; but if you follow the say-show distinction 
then everything of importance, i.e., ethics, aesthetics, human relationships, 
etc., shows itself to us far more than anything we say about it. This does not 
mean, as the logical positivists or Vienna Circle were to misinterpret him as 
saying, that everything other than the physical is not just unspeakable, but 
unreal. Later in his career, he was to place greater emphasis on the idea that 
although we cannot describe the ethical or aesthetic, we can express it. The 
However he had quite a bit of difficulty getting Tractatus published. It 
seemed that publishers expected a treatise on how the world is from phi-
losophers, not one pointing out that we can’t say how the world is. Part of 
the criticism of industrial culture, that he expressed in letters and conver-
sations with friends, was that ‘scientism’ had taken over from traditional 
religion. Both had the effect of shifting attention away from this world to 
another world. Traditional religions to one of heavens and angels controlling 
the world from behind the scenes; ‘scientism’ to one of mechanical explana-
tion — the idea that everything has a scientific explanation, and our atten-
tion is captured by imaginary laws governing the universe from behind the 
scenes. “Science is a way of sending us to sleep, philosophy must serve to wake 
us up” (1980, p.5). “The whole modern conception of the world is founded on 
the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural 
phenomena” (1961, §6.371). “Laws … are about the net and not about what the 
net describes” (1961, §6.35). “There must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone 
must take its place” (1958, §109). 
Tractatus — Facts
Following these brief comments on his methodology and aim we can begin 
to look at the Tractatus, which was finally published in English in 1922. The 
Tractatus begins with the statement that “[t]he world is the totality of facts, 
not of things” (1961, §1.1). Now for most of us, having grown up in a culture 
when positivism reigns, and we think of ourselves as separate from a world 
we endeavour to capture in a net of reasoning (logic and mathematics), we 
would think that the world is made of things, and facts are our attempts to 
make sense of the things. However Wittgenstein makes sense here if we con-
sider that the bird sees the cat as a cat, not as ‘sense data’ or an object (a 
‘thing’) that it interprets as a cat (as Locke had argued). For living beings, our 
reaction is immediate and not mediated by interpretation (cf. 1961 §5.5423). 
We live in a world of facts. When we look at those ambiguous figures like 
the Necker cube, the kissing vase, or the duck-rabbit, we see one or the other 
of the aspects. Looking at the Necker cube we don’t see 12 straight lines and 
then interpret this one way or the other. We immediately see one of the cubes, 
and then with a slight shift in attention we see the other. In other words we 
see facts, or to say it slightly differently, our sense making is primary and 
not secondary. And as these ambiguous figures show, there are different ways 
of making sense. So what Wittgenstein is doing is helping us make sense of 
our sense making from within the world, not from an assumed (“objective”) 5. See Drury (2006) for an account of Goethe’s ‘delicate empiricism’ as a method of science closer to Wittgenstein.
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covering that connects different propositions together. As we shall see, this 
say-show distinction is not limited to the so-called logical objects, but also 
to all the important things to us as people — ethics, aesthetics, religion, art, 
music, and understanding people. If you like, it is preferable to regards these 
things as showing themselves in their expression than in what they say. A 
case of actions speaking louder than words.
The upshot was whilst Russell thought, in keeping with the scientific or 
positivistic traditions of our culture, he was discovering real ideas (that lay 
the foundations for mathematics and logic [and “mathematics is a method 
of logic” {1961, §6.234}], and so were real things for Russell); Wittgenstein 
thought it more useful to consider these ideas as senseless (although not 
useless) artefacts that come from the social activity of doing mathematics or 
talking logically. Once you see this aspect (what we now call the ‘socially con-
structed’ nature) of these ideas, you will see they are essentially senseless, in 
that they do not refer to anything tangible that resides in the world. One of the 
ways he did this was to show us that the so-called propositions of logic are 
tautologies (“I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either 
raining or not raining” (1961, §4.461)); they say nothing about the world as it 
is. However talk about the weather shows that raining and not raining struc-
ture both language and the world. Then, as he proceeds he goes on to show us 
that his own arguments or propositions about logic are also meaningless, but 
if we get what he is showing us, then they are not entirely useless. 
Mathematics and logic as social constructions
Possibly, because most Western intellectuals position themselves as observ-
ers of the world, rather than participants, they seem to struggle with this idea 
that mathematics and logic, which “look like a fact of nature” (something we 
discover) are better considered inventions (1978, II, §37). “I shall try again 
and again to show that what is considered a mathematical discovery had much 
better be called a mathematical invention” (1976, p.22). Money is of course 
such an invention, or what we would now call a socially constructed ‘real-
ity’ — as these pieces of paper, plastic, or metal obtain their value or ‘reality’ 
through the tacit agreement we have through using them. As Searle (1995) 
says, “the very definition of the word “money” is self-referential” (p.32). Social 
realities are made up of constitutive rules, not regulative rules. Or intrinsic or 
tacit rules, not extrinsic or explicit laws. Lore not laws regulate social realities. 
We can deconstruct (lay open to view) social constructions, and that may lead 
us to play or construct different realities, but we can’t step outside them (cf. 
Shotter, 2012 for a discussion on the relationship to Whorf).6 
metaphors of religion, literature, and art are expressions of what we can see 
far more clearly than we can say. In the Tractatus he expressed it thus: “There 
are, indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves man-
ifest. They are what is mystical” (1961, §6.522). (The word ‘mystical’ stems 
from the Greek ‘muen’ meaning to keep silent.)
He then goes on to describe how we present these ‘facts’ in our language, 
and at this point introduces us to the idea that language pictures the world. 
(In his later writings (1930 onwards) he expresses some regret in restricting 
the use of language to picturing or representing reality in the  Tractatus, for 
of course there are all sorts of other ways language is used — giving orders, 
asking a question, thanking, etc., (1958, §23). However, we might say that 
empirical science’s primary function is to present descriptions of the facts. 
[But even there, a Wittgensteinian writer, Spencer Brown (1969), argues that 
science and mathematics are primarily prescriptive — ‘look down a micro-
scope’, ‘drop a perpendicular’]). However, during this early period, he was in 
agreement with Russell that propositions (statements of facts) picture the 
world, and so both had an interest in the structure of propositions (i.e. logic). 
Russell thinking that this structure (logic) is discoverable (laws of thought), 
and Wittgenstein trying to show they are inventions.
Russell, who took the positivist position outside or apart from the world, 
thought there must be ‘meta-propositions’ (propositions about propositions, 
i.e., ‘logical objects’), which he expressed in his theory of logical typing. But 
for Wittgenstein, who saw himself as a participant in the world, there were 
no ‘meta-propositions’ that were grounded in reality. For Wittgenstein, the 
structure (logic) of our propositions reflect the expressions of our percep-
tions, which as we have seen with the Necker cube or duck-rabbit, can vary. 
(Although at the time of the Tractatus he thought propositions had a gen-
eral form. He was later to regret that.) Just as the elements of a portrait are 
arranged in a way to resemble the person they represent, the structure of 
our propositions resemble the aspect we are seeing (the duck or the rab-
bit). They say more about us than the world (Shotter, 2012). He said that his 
fundamental idea is that this order cannot be said, but shows itself (1961, 
§4.0312). He argued with Russell, saying that we are limited in only being 
able to say empirical propositions; we are only able to describe facts in the 
world. If we try to say something about the structure of the world, and this 
includes so-called scientific laws, we are stepping out of the world into some 
sort of meta (-physical) realm, and this generates all sorts of ghosts and 
conundrums such as an infinite regress of laws behind laws. Thus Wittgen-
stein distinguishes what can be said, the propositions of science, from what 
can be shown, the so-called logical objects that Russell thought he was dis-
5
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(even if we now have no theoretical justification for these acts!). Surely, I hear 
you say, if we have no world-view then we have no basis for acting ethically, 
and this ‘therapeutic philosophy’ is going to bring further chaos on the world!
This is where we return to Wittgenstein’s interest in Kierkegaard and 
Schopenhauer. Because we had been standing back from life, trying to under-
stand it theoretically, or capture the world in a net of reasoning, we had been 
avoiding or evading the everyday requirements that life makes on us to act. 
We had been sitting in academic ivory towers philosophizing, and ignor-
ing the plight of those around us. What actions we were taking, were being 
mediated through some world-view or philosophy. The therapy of the  Trac-
tatus transforms us, so that our ‘will’ is now more directly and immediately 
engaged with life. We are now more present to life. It’s a therapy that leads us 
to see that our attempts to formulate, what we thought was the ‘problem of 
life’ (e.g. that the universe appears to have an order that can be known objec-
tively to us), as well as the attempted solutions that came from those formula-
tions, has just led us into greater confusion. Liberated from this confusion, we 
are now more committed to acting with resolution. (We might say we become 
more disciplined.) This is called the ‘resolute’ reading of Wittgenstein (Read 
& Crary, 2000; Fischer, 2011; Bronzo, 2012). When Wittgenstein concludes 
the  Tractatus with the famous injunction “[w]hereof one cannot speak, thereof 
one must be silent”, for the resolute reader this silence is ‘pregnant’ as we 
are primed to act. Some draw a parallel here with Heidegger’s writings on 
authenticity (Cahill, 2004). 
On having no head
One of the things dissolved (like sugar in water) by the Tractatus, is the ego 
or sense of being a Cartesian self (“I think, therefore I am”), separate from 
the world. Nietzsche had seen that the “I” is an artefact of the noun-verb 
structure of grammar, and has no more existence than the “it” in “it is rain-
ing”. Hume too, saw that there was no ego or self that is an object of experi-
ence. The thinking subject is not an entity that is separate from what he or 
she thinks — “There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains 
ideas” (1961, §5.631). If you like, there is thinking or seeing going on, but no 
one who is thinking or seeing (no little homunculus inside your head). The 
Cartesian error had come about because we can distinguish an empirical or 
objective subject — the person I see in the mirror and other people, and the 
apparent subject who (we tell ourselves) must be doing the seeing and think-
ing. When we start introspecting we can get the two confused, as Descartes 
did.8 Dissolving this confusion, we see “I” is a pronoun, not a noun.
Understanding this difference between intrinsic and extrinsic rules we can 
see how Wittgenstein thought Russell and his cohorts were treating philos-
ophy as a science aimed at (saying) discovering the foundations of logic and 
mathematics, what Boole before them called the ‘laws of thought’. By con-
trast what Wittgenstein wanted to do was show us how we are creating these 
apparent (mathematical and logical) ‘truths’ in doing mathematics or speak-
ing logically. 
We don’t need to explicitly know formal logic to speak logically; language 
existed long before there were logicians, and even little children who are 
competent language users can distinguish nonsense from sense. A useful way 
to see how mathematics is an invention rather than discoveries is to consider 
mathematics as being like other inventions, especially the microscope or a 
pair of glasses. These are all useful inventions for helping us see facts that we 
might not have seen without them. They help us extend our perceptual power. 
Also we learnt how to double things or cut things in half long before we had 
or learnt numbers. Numbers and mathematics was a useful invention to give 
expression to what we were doing when we cut something in half.
 When we learn chess, mathematics, or even everyday things like good 
hygiene, the rules are an expression of the game or way of life; the rules are 
not independent of their application.7 But we all too easily turn these intrin-
sic regularities into external rules that must be obeyed (cf, 1961, §6.37). This 
seems especially so if we have had a fright of some sort or believe these rules 
to be causal. It is not difficult to discover this kind of shift has occurred in 
those difficulties some call phobias and obsessions. For example, the expres-
sion of good hygiene has taken on a demand characteristic after the intrinsic 
rules have been separated from the activity (Heaton, 2010). 
The Tractatus as Therapy
We might say then, that through studying the Tractatus we come realise that 
we are already aware of the logic of our language due to our everyday use of 
it. Tractatus is primarily a therapeutic text helping us see that everyday lan-
guage is perfectly suited to our needs, and the idea that we need a theoretical 
account of logic is just part of a widespread confusion that we need any theory 
at all (Parry, 2009). Once we have dispelled the idea that we need any theory, 
including the ones of the Tractatus, then we can express or act more ethically 
6. See note 4 on page 5. 
7. Daniel Everett’s Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes (2009) provides a readable account of a mis-
sionary’s discovery that Chomsky’s universal grammar doesn’t apply to the Pirahā people of 
Brazil.
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just one  — “The act of the will … is the action itself” (1984, p.87, 4.11.16).) 
Note however, there is no certainty here. “The events of the future cannot 
be inferred from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal 
nexus” (1961, §5.1361). A meteorite might plunge through the roof before I 
finish typing this sentence. “There is no compulsion making one thing happen 
because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical neces-
sity” (1961, §6.37). So although I might make predictions and exercise my 
will, it is only by the grace of the universe (in not sending meteorites through 
my roof), that these work out for me. “[A] favour granted by fate, so to speak” 
(1961, §6.372). 
So we might say, as some religious texts do, that there are two ‘wills’ in 
play here, mine and God’s (or the universe’s). “There are two godheads: the 
world and my independent I” (1984, p.74, 9:7:16). If mine is in accord with 
the universe’s will then things work out happily for me, but if not, the uni-
verse, so to speak, pushes back against me. “In order to live happily I must 
be in agreement with the world … That is to say: ‘I am doing the will of God’ ” 
(1984, p.75. 9:7:16). When the universe pushes back, my world shrinks, as I 
am the boundary (or limits) of my world; and when I am in accord with it, my 
world expands. “If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it 
can only alter the limits of the world, not the facts — not what can be expressed 
by means of language. In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether 
different world. It must so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of 
the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man” (1961, §6.43). 
“Feeling the world as a limited whole — it is this that is mystical” (1961, §6.45). 
Thus, the Tractatus has enabled us to see an ethical position that is quite 
unlike Descartes (1637/1998) dictum to be “the masters and possessors of 
nature” that now so characterises positivistic industrial culture. For the laws 
that we sought to discover that would enable us to manipulate nature to our 
will turned out to be “about the net and not what the net describes” (1961, 
§6.35). But, by emptying ourselves or attuning our will to the universe, as 
most religions had taught in some form, our sense of self expands to experi-
ence the universe more. It is not possible to say what the limit of this expan-
sion might be. This ethic is an ecology of mind (Bateson, 1972).
Dowsing is the art of divining for water, and provides us with a sense of this 
word ‘divine’. Goethe developed this as a method of science, an alternative to 
Newton’s, which he called the ‘delicate empiricism’. For Goethe, we become 
the scientific instrument, by making ourselves one with the phenomena we 
wish to understand, feeling it out from the ‘inside’ so to speak (Drury, 2006; 
Seamon & Zajonc, 2006). As I have shown elsewhere, this is an approach to 
science and psychotherapy that is also far more consistent with some indig-
Wittgenstein’s way of dissolving the self (or ‘I’) in Tractatus was by leading 
us through an argument on a form of solipsism. Solipsism is the idea that I 
alone exist; I am creating the whole world. (It is a difficult doctrine to argue 
against, but fun to imagine a conference of solipsists arguing as to which one 
of them is really there!) He starts out by noting that “what the solipsist means 
is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest” (1961, §5.62). 
That is, we can take the view that “The world and life are one” (1961, §5.621). 
Or, “I am my world” (1961, §5.63). We see this solipsism in the child who 
says after anaesthesia, “They stuck a needle in my arm and I disappeared”. 
Or another of Wittgenstein’s ways of pointing at it: “At death the world does 
not alter, but comes to an end” (1961, §6.431). So you might ask, where am I, 
or where is the subject in this world that I am? Well, “[t]he subject does not 
belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world” (1961, §5.632). Alterna-
tively, “You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual 
field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows 
you to infer that it is seen by an eye” (1961, §5.633). However experientially 
the eye or “I” is not outside the visual field. That is to say, there is “no part of 
our experience [which] is at the same time a priori” (1961, §5.634). It is not in 
the experiential field, and it is not outside it; it is the experiential field (“I am 
my world”). As one Zen Buddhist writer noted, it is living life as if one had no 
head (Harding, 1961).
So as we begin to understand this, a psychological transformation occurs 
and we feel our sense of self shrinking to nothing or expanding to the limits 
of our experiential field (as far as my eyes can see and ears can hear). “The self 
of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality 
coordinated with it” (1961, §5.64). Kremer (2004) says this is the self-empty-
ing described in religious experience, where by becoming nothing or shrink-
ing to an extension-less point (or by becoming everything), God, Dharma, the 
Tao, the Force, Al-lah, (etc.), can enter in. 
Doing ‘God’s’ Will and ‘Divining’
‘But surely,’ you say, ‘I have my will, and that is separate from the world’. On 
this point Wittgenstein agrees — “The world is independent of my will” (1961, 
§6.373). However we can easily be led into an egotistical trap here (one 
that is fuelled by our culture’s ‘scientism’ or Cartesianism). We often exer-
cise our will by predicting what is going to happen, and then taking action. 
(Although more frequently there is not two things, planning and acting, but 
8. Wittgenstein (1961, 1966) refers to the often unnoticed slippage that occurs between the use 
of “is” as verb and then as an adjective to show how this confusion occurs. 
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As de Shazer made clear in a number of his writings, SFBT does not have a 
philosophical theory underlying it, and Wittgenstein’s work does not provide 
the (missing or hidden) theory. For both there is nothing hidden. But Witt-
genstein is useful in helping deconstruct many of the positivistic assumptions 
therapists have been socialised into, and once understood, his aphorisms can 
serve as helpful reminders. For “Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself” 
(1980, p. 34e), (especially I might add, in a culture where positivism reigns). 
As noted above de Shazer uses Wittgenstein’s aphorisms as reminders to 
remain observant of what is going on, especially with the language actually 
used by the client, staying on the surface and not giving in to the urge to dig 
deeper for an underlying pathology, and such like.
For the positivist the idea that talking about solutions as a way of talk-
ing our way out of problems may appear superficial, but from Wittgenstein’s 
elucidations on how we socially construct the realities we inhabit it seems 
clear that all therapies are endeavouring to do this in one way or another. Not 
only that but Wittgenstein’s elucidations on the boundaries of what is being 
socially constructed shows that there will always be phenomena occurring 
that have not been enlisted into a social construction. In SFBT we express this 
by saying that change is always going on, or the solutions are already pres-
ent in our client’s lives, and questions about exceptions may elicit candidates 
for the solution-focused construction. Similarly questions about how clients 
cope with such a problem may show more clearly strengths and resiliencies 
that the client is possibly bringing to the solution. 
Wittgenstein’s elucidations on ethics also remind us of our way of being 
in therapy. The difficulty here is in showing this; for: “It is clear that ethics 
cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are 
one and the same)” (1961, §6.421). When we look at Wittgenstein’s way of 
life we begin to glimpse what he means by this. One of the richest men in 
Europe, with the equivalent of a Victoria Cross, gives away all his money and 
is living in a gardener’s shed — what is he showing us? In his Notebooks he 
had written: “I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am com-
pletely powerless. I can only make myself independent of the world — and so in 
a certain sense master it — by renouncing any influence on happenings” (1984, 
p.73, 11.6.16). This is quite a different attitude to Descartes “masters and pos-
sessors of nature”, which we see in applied behaviourism.
In SFBT we express Wittgenstein’s ethic by reminding ourselves not to be 
working harder than the client; or as Brian Cade expressed it “It is important 
never to be more enthusiastic about the need for any particular change than 
is the client” (Cade, 2013). Our task is to be present and responsive. Our eth-
ics express themselves, or can be seen in how we are involved in what we 
enous ‘ways of knowing’ (Drury, 2011). And it is this that the Tractatus has 
shown us is of importance, not what can be said. 
An End of Philosophy
Now Wittgenstein delivered this into the citadel of the church of Western ‘sci-
entism’, and it is of little wonder that few understood him. To utilise a meta-
phor from his later philosophy, a place had not been prepared for it. Perhaps 
amusingly, when he was giving his oral defence of the  Tractatus for his PhD 
at Cambridge in 1929 he patted his examiners Russell and G. E. Moore on the 
back, saying, “Don’t worry, I know you’ll never understand it.” He told Drury 
that it would take about 100 years to be understood, and maybe we are seeing 
this as the ‘resolute and elucidatory readings’ catches the intellectual interest. 
By the time he returned from the war in 1919 he was one of the richest 
men in Europe, due to his late father having invested the family fortune wisely. 
He also believed that he had answered all the important questions of phi-
losophy and there was no need to pursue it further. So in keeping with his 
religious ideas or teachings he gave away his entire fortune, mainly to his 
siblings, and began training as a schoolteacher. He insisted on living the rest 
of his life like a monk, and went to teach ‘peasant’ children in the poorest of 
Alpine villages. After getting sacked as a teacher in 1926 for hitting children, 
he worked for a while in an Austrian monastery as a gardener (living in the 
tool shed). Despite numerous invitations to return to Cambridge, he saw no 
value in it. Later in that decade he formed a business partnership in Vienna, 
with his old Cambridge friend and fellow Austrian, Engelmann, as architects; 
and together they designed and had a house built for Wittgenstein’s sister 
Gretl. This was to be his new career.
Besides the  Tractatus, the only other things he ever published in his life-
time were a children’s dictionary when he was teaching; a book review of Cof-
fey’s The Science of Logic in 1913; a short paper in 1912 entitled “What is phi-
losophy’; and an article entitled ‘Some remarks on logical form’ in 1929 (that 
he characterised as short and weak (1993, p.156). Since his death numerous 
lecture notes, notes taken by students at lectures, notebooks, and a manu-
script he was preparing have been published. It is perhaps highly noteworthy 
in these times of ‘publish or perish’, that he managed to publish so little and 
still be regarded by many as the most important philosopher of the 20th cen-
tury. 
The Tractatus and SFBT
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philosophy as the pursuit of truth about meaning, and thus made philosophy 
into science. He realised that the claim in the  Tractatus that all propositions 
have a general form, an essence if you like, was misleading, and it was this 
that was driving the Vienna Circle and others to search for the method of 
science. He began making plans to return to Cambridge … .
References
Anderson, H. & Goolishian, H. (1992). The client is the expert: A not-knowing approach 
to therapy. In S. McNamee & K. Gergen (Eds.) Social Construction and the Thera-
peutic Process. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine.
Bronzo, S. (2012). The resolute reading and its critics: An introduction to the litera-
ture. Wittgenstein-Studien, 3(1), 45-80. doi: 10.1515/wgst.2012.45
Brown, G. S. (1969). Laws of Form. London: Allen & Unwin.
Cade, B. (2013). Comment on the SFT-L bulletin board, 24th May 2013. http://www.
sft-l.sikt.nu/
Cahill, K. (2004). The Tractatus, ethics, and authenticity. Journal of Philosophical 
Research, 29, 267-288. doi: 10.5840/jpr_2004_4
Cornish, K. (1998). The Jew of Linz: Wittgenstein, Hitler and Their Secret Battle of the 
Mind. London: Century.
Descartes, R. (1637/1998). Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. D. 
A. Cress (trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
De Shazer, S. (2005). “Don’t think, but observe”: What is the importance of the work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein for Solution-Focused Brief Therapy? Downloaded January 8 
2014 from www.sfbta.org/bftc/steve&insoo_pdfs/don’t_think_but_observe.pdf
De Shazer, S. (1994). Words Were Originally Magic. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Diamond, C. (1991). Ethics, imagination and the method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
In R. Heinrich & H. Vetter (Eds.) Bildere der Philosophie, Wiener Reihe 5. Vienna: 
Oldenbourg.
Drury, M. O’C. (1984). Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein. In R. Rhees 
(Ed.) Recollections of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Drury, N. (2006). The delicate scientist practitioner. Australian and New Zealand Jour-
nal of Family Therapy, 27(4), 177-186.
Drury, N. (2011). Wittgenstein and the tikanga of psychotherapy. New Zealand Journal 
of Psychology, 40(2), 16-24.
Englemann, P. (1967). Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
Everett, D. L. (2009). Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: Life and Language in the Amazo-
nian Jungle. New York: Vintage. 
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The positivists had positioned science as the pursuit of truth and philosophy 
as the pursuit of meaning — but Wittgenstein realised that this positioned 
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